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 Introduction The last decades have seen an explosive growth in biosciences
and astonishing progress in the mathematical modelling of elds as diverse as
neurobiology membrane formation biomechanics embryology etc see eg J
Murray 	

 The sequencing of biomolecules produces such a vast wealth of data
on proteins and polynucleotides that the mere handling of the stored information
becomes a computational challenge let alone the analysis of phylogenetic trees
and functional networks which is the main task of bioinformatics
The recent advances in our understanding of the chemical mechanisms de
scribing the interactions of specic molecules  how virus for example use binding
proteins to attack and penetrate hosts cells  are spectacular but do not suce to
tackle basic problems like disease progression or the coevolution of hosts and par
asites It is populations of virus particles or immune cells or hosts that regulate
each others frequencies The feedback loops of these ecosystems are too complex
to be understood by verbal arguments alone The biological community has come
to accept that basic aspects of immunology and evolutionary ecology can only be
analysed by mathematical means
This has not always been the case The pioneering work in genetics due to
Fisher Haldane Wright and Kimura as well as the epidemiological models of
Kermack and McKendrick occupied a marginal position in biology for the most
part of this century while at the same time motivating important mathematical
advances in statistics stochastic processes and dynamical systems Fisher 	
	
on correlation Kolmogoro 	
 on travelling waves in a gene pool May 	

on chaos The models of evolutionary biology cannot compete in mathematical
depth and sophistication with those of theoretical physics but they oer a wide
range of questions of great intuitive appeal
This lecture surveys mathematical models in ecology and evolution empha
sising the major feedback mechanisms regulating the population densities of the
interacting selfreplicating units  be they genes virus particles immune cells or
host organisms The great variety of biological examples made it necessary to
economise on mathematical diversity by keeping to the framework of ordinary dif
ferential equations This is certainly not meant to imply that time delays spatial
heterogeneities and stochastic uctuations are secondary eects In fact they have
a major impact in many applications see eg the survey by Levin et al 	

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 Population ecology If we assume that n species live in an ecosystem that
x
i
is the density of species i and that its per capita growth rate x
i
x
i
depends on
the densities of the interacting populations then we obtain the ecological equation
x
i
 x
i
f
i
x 	
The state space R
n
 
is invariant so are its boundary faces where one or several
of the densities are  and the restriction of 	 to a face is again an ecological
equation If the f
i
are ane linear we obtain  as simplest example  the Lotka
Volterra equation
x
i
 x
i
r
i

X
a
ij
x
j
 
i  	  n It should be stated right at the outset that many ecological interac
tions display more complex interaction terms but often  oers a rst approx
imation which is exible enough to embody the main aspects of the community
structure Hofbauer and Sigmund 	

 For instance if 	 is a prey species and
 its predator we obtain
x

 x

a bx

 
x

 x

c dx

  
where a b c d   In intR

 
there exists a unique xed point cd ab which
is surrounded by periodic orbits If we add a selflimitation of the prey ie set
f

 a ex

 bx

in  we obtain damped oscillations around the xed point
or if e   is large extinction of the predator see g 	
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Fig  Predatorprey equations
On the other hand if 	 and  are species competing for the same resources
we have to assume that the intrinsic growth rates satisfy r
i
  and the interaction
terms a
ij
  i j  f	 g On each positive halfaxis there is one xed point
F
i
corresponding to equilibrium of species i in the absence of the other species
Generically there are three possible outcomes see g 
a dominance all orbits in intR

 
converge to F
i
 species i is said to dominate
the other species
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b coexistence there exists a xed point F

 intR

 
which is globally stable
ie attracts all orbits in intR

 

c bistability F

is a saddle almost all orbits in intR

 
converge to F

or
F

 depending on the initial condition
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Fig  Competition equations
Because twodimensional LotkaVolterra equations admit no limit cycles their
dynamics can be easily classied for three or more species this is no longer the
case Systems with two competing species and one prey exhibit chaos and systems
with three competing species which are monotonic and hence admit no chaos
see Hirsch 	
 have not been classied yet in spite of impressive progress van
den Driessche and Zeeman 	

 One of the reasons is the existence of hete
roclinic cycles see g a May and Leonard 	
 If in the absence of the
third species species 	 dominates   dominates  and  in turn dominates 	
then the boundary of R

 
contains a heteroclinic cycle consisting of three saddle
points F
i
with only species i present and three connecting orbits orbit o

has
F

as  and F

as limit etc Depending on the products of the eigenvalues
in the stable and unstable directions this heteroclinic cycle can attract or repel
the neighbouring orbits in intR

 
 Three competing species with heteroclinic cy
cles have been found in laboratory populations In higher dimensional ecological
models heteroclinic cycles become common Such cycles are nongeneric features
for general dynamical systems since saddleconnections can be destroyed by ar
bitrarily small perturbations Within the class of ecological equations however
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which leave the boundary faces of R
n
 
invariant heteroclinic cycles and networks
where several cycles issue from one saddle are usually robust Such attractors
oer a new brand of nonlinear dynamics orbits approach saddle points ever more
closely and remain there for increasingly long times furthermore the sequence of
saddles visited by an orbit can switch in arbitrary order from one cycle to another
Chawanya 	


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Fig  Heteroclinic orbits and networks
 Permanence If the orbit of an ecosystem reaches the neighborhood of a
heteroclinic attractor on the boundary some species are doomed The ecosystem
in that case is unstable this notion of stability has nothing to do however with
the usual asymptotic stability of a xed point which is a local notion A more
suitable stability notion in this context is that of permanence 	 is said to be
permanent if the boundary including innity is a repellor ie if there exists a
compact set K  intR
n
 
such that whenever initially x  intR
n
 
 then xt  K for
t suciently large After a transient phase all densities are uniformly bounded
away from  This notion has been extensively explored see the survey by Hutson
and Schmitt 	

 Permanence implies the existence of a xed point in intR
n
 

but this point need not be locally stable and indeed ecologists view an ecosystem
as stable even if it exhibits violent oscillations as long as its species remain safe
from extinction
For a dissipative system all orbits uniformly bounded from above the most
useful sucient condition for permanence is the existence of an average Lyapunov
function This is a function P vanishing on the boundary and positive on the
interior such that the continuous extension  of the logarithmic derivative of P
has the property that for every limit point x on bdR
n
 
there is a T   with
Z
T

xtdt   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Then P grows in the long run along every interior orbit suciently close to the
boundary In particular  is permanent if all orbits are uniformly bounded and
the set
N  fx  R
n
 
 r
i

X
a
ij
x
j
  i  	  ng 
is disjoint from the convex hull of the xed points on the boundary The condition
is not necessary for permanence if n   But if  is permanent then there
is a unique equilibrium

x with all species present and it is the limit of all time
averages of orbits in the interior of the statespace If D is the Jacobian at x then
	
n
detD   and trace D   Furthermore 	
n
detA   where A is the
matrix of the interaction terms a
ij
Hofbauer and Sigmund 	


 InvasionMany studies have considered the assembly of ecological communities
by sequential invasion ie adding one species at a time Will species n  	
grow when introduced in small numbers If the resident system is in equilibrium
z  z

  z
n
 this simply means to check whether the growth rate f
n 
z 
is positive If the competition between two species is bistable for instance none
can invade the other If there is coexistence each can invade etc Invasion is
a question of transversal stability which if the resident system admits a chaotic
attractor oers subtle ergodic twists involving riddled basins of attraction etc
Ferriere and Gatto 	

 Ashwin et al 	


If the resident species obey a permanent LotkaVolterra equation with xed
point z  intS
n
 the condition f
n 
z    implies that the lim sup of the in
vading species density is positive but tells nothing about the lim inf The new
attractor need not be close to the former one the invading species can drive others
to extinction and even ultimately itself Hofbauer 	

 has found conditions in
terms of spatial or temporal averages of the initial growth rate which guarantee
that the invasion of a permanent LotkaVolterra community succeeds His bifur
cation analysis allows to decide whether if a parameter changes so that invasion
becomes possible the new attractor is contained in a neighborhood of the resident
attractor or not The invasion of a heteroclinic cycle is a particularly arduous
problem
Evidence from eld studies and numerical simulations suggest that ecosys
tems become increasingly harder to invade as time goes on and that there is an
upper limit to how closely packed species can be but so far this has only been
demonstrated under restrictive assumptions Interestingly predators can stabilise
ecosystems if a keystone predator is removed from a permanent system the
remaining system is no longer permanent For instance if species 	 dominates
species  or if the competition between species 	  and  results in a heteroclinic
attractor then a suitable predator can mediate coexistence Schreiber 	

 has
produced systems with n competing prey each with its specialised predator such
that removal of any predator species results in only one prey species surviving
Such ecosystems cannot be obtained by simply adding one species at a time se
quential assembly has to proceed in a more roundabout way using species that
are later eliminated like a scaolding These results agree well with the current
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emphasis of biologists on the role of contingency and history dependence in real
ecological succession chronicles and highlight the fact that a successful invasion
can initiate a surprising sequence of changes in the ecosystem see Mylius et al
	


	 Replicator Dynamics Competition between conspecics drives natural se
lection The basic mechanism is simple an inheritable trait which allows for a
higher reproductive success spreads in the population This can lead to extraordi
nary feats of adaptation due to relentless optimisation under constraint In fact
some computational approaches to optimisation problems are mimicking the mas
sively parallel algorithm of Darwinian evolution Within populations of possible
solutions to a given problem for instance in aerodynamics those which perform
better are allowed to multiply at the expense of the others Occasionally some
ospring is randomly altered corresponding to the mutation or recombination of
existing solutions Such genetic algorithms allow to explore the space of solutions
and often to home in on some optima Forrest 	


But in biology it is the population itself that is often the problem The
eciency of a wing shape may be independent on what the other birds are doing
but the success of a sex ratio or of a given degree of aggressivity is not In a
population with a surplus of males it pays to produce females it pays to escalate
a conict if the others are unlikely to escalate but otherwise it is better to avoid
escalating etc Game theory rather than optimisation is appropriate to deal with
problems where the success depends on what the others are doing
Assume that x
i
is the frequency of the individuals using strategy i i 
	  n A strategy in this context is simply a trait behavioural physiologi
cal morphological whose payo ie average reproductive success depends on
the frequencies x of the competing types If the traits are inherited the frequen
cies will evolve in time depending on their success If individuals breed true the
per capita rate of increase x
i
x
i
is given by the dierence f
i


f  where f
i
x is
the average payo for using i if the population is in state x and

f 
P
x
j
f
j
is
the average success in the population This yields the replicator equation
x
i
 x
i
f
i
x

f i  	  n 
on the simplex S
n
 fx  R
n
 

P
x
i
 	g This simplex is invariant and so are
its faces The replicator equation is closely related to the ecological equation 	
of course It introduces an ecological viewpoint into game theory
Let us consider a conict between pairs of individuals for instance some
contest over a resource and assume that the strategies i correspond to dierent
types of ghting behaviour and that a
ij
is the average payo for using i if the
coplayer uses j Then the payo matrix A  a
ij
 determines the average pay
o Ax
i
 a
i
x

   a
in
x
n
for strategy i in the population assuming that
individuals meet randomly and  turns into
x
i
 x
i
Ax
i
 x
T
Ax 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This equation is not only similar but actually equivalent to a LotkaVolterra
equation for n  	 species a dieomorphism from S
n
minus one face to R
n 
 
maps orbits of one dynamical system onto the other and vice versa For n   we
obtain the same generic behaviour as for two competitors dominance coexistence
or bistability For n   heteroclinic cycles show up not just as a theoretic
possibility the mate guarding strategies of male lizards form a rockscissorspaper
cycle With n   limit cycles and chaotic attractors occur  is permanent if
there exists a p  p

  p
n
 with p
i
  for all i such that for every equilibrium
z on the boundary
p
T
Az  z
T
Az 

a conditions that can easily be checked by linear programming etc
Frequencydependent selection will not optimise in general Only for very
special interaction do replicator equations become gradients if the game is
symmetric for instance A  A
T
 or more generally if the partial derivatives
f
ij
 	f
i
	x
j
obey
f
ij
 f
jk
 f
kl
 f
lk
 f
kj
 f
ji
	
for all i j k one has to use a suitable Riemannian metric on S
n
 cf Hofbauer and
Sigmund 	



 Other Game Dynamics Among higher animals and in particular humans
strategies can also spread by learning and imitation Depending on the details of
transmission this leads to a large number of game dynamics for the frequencies x
i

often based on underlying stochastic processes Again the replicator dynamics is
a kind of benchmark Another example is the best reply dynamics a dierential
inclusion
x
i
 
x x
i
		
where 
x is the set of strategies whose payo in a population where strategy i
occurs with frequency x
i
 is maximal The idea is that in every short time interval
a small fraction of the players updates their strategy these players know how to
optimise but do not anticipate that others will also update The orbits of 		
are piecewise linear Intriguingly their asymptotic behaviour is often that of the
time averages of the solutions of the replicator equation 
This brings one closer to classical game theory Let us consider a game with
payo matrix A and assume that points p  S
n
are mixed strategies p
i
being the
probability for a player to use strategy i Then p is a best reply to q  S
n
if
p
T
Aq  x
T
Aq for all x  S
n
 A point p is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if it is
a best reply against itself A Nash equilibrium is a xed point for  and every
other decent game dynamics but the converse need not hold In fact the Nash
equilibria are precisely the xed points of  which are saturated  missing pure
strategies have no selective advantage Every game with nitely many strategies
has a Nash equilibrium but there are games such that almost no solution under
any reasonable adjustment dynamics converges to a Nash equilibrium
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Evolutionary game theory has originated with the concept of evolutionarily
stable strategies ESS Intuititively a strategy q is said to be an ESS if whenever
all members of the population adopt it an invading and suciently small minor
ity using a dierent strategy has no selective advantage Maynard Smith 	

This means that q is Nash and that whenever p is an alternative best reply to q
then q
T
Ap  p
T
Ap Equivalently q is an ESS if
q
T
Ax  x
T
Ax 	
for all x  q in a neighborhood of q Not every game has an ESS The connexion
with the replicator equation is given by the following characterisation q  S
n
is
an ESS if and only if whenever q is a convex combination of the possibly mixed
strategies p

  p
m
 the mean population strategy
P
x
i
p
i
converges under the
replicator dynamics towards q if initially it was close to q Cressman 	

 The
idea that evolution always results in an ESS is not justied however There exist
considerably more complex outcomes as captured in the notion of an evolutionarily
stable attractor for instance Rand et al 	

 
 Longterm Evolution So far we have assumed that ospring are clones of
their parent like begets like The machinery of Mendelian inheritance is much
more complex and we have to follow the frequencies of genes in the gene pool of the
population As long as the instruction is contained in one genetic locus an address
in the genome housing two genes  one from the father and the other from the
mother the corresponding dynamics for the gene frequencies in the population
is still of replicator type  But in general the trait depends on several genetic
loci which can be recombined during reproduction and the dynamics becomes
challenging
The state x of the gene pool determines the frequencies of the dierent types
of individuals who use dierent pure or mixed strategies This determines the
frequencies px of the strategies in the population and hence the reproductive
success of each type and therefore the rate of change in the gene frequencies x
If the trait is determined by one genetic locus only and if there are at most two
pure strategies or three types of genes which can occur on that locus then an
ESS q which is feasible is strategically stable in the sense that if a state

x of
the gene pool satises p

x  q then every nearby state x remains close to

x
and px converges back to q Cressman et al 	

 For more complex genetic
mechanisms the relation between evolutionary stability and longterm stability
ie strategic stability against every invasion attempt remains unclear and oers
a wealth of problems on normal forms and center manifold theory The replicator
dynamics can be used as a rst approximation in the absence of more specic
information on the genetic background That kind of information is likely to be
provided soon and will act as a motivational booster for the population genetics
of frequencydependent selection
At the present state the best prospects for studying longterm evolution are
oered by adaptive dynamics It is based on the assumption that replication is
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only almost exact and that occasional mistakes  mutations  occur so rarely
that the fate of one mutation its extinction or xation under selection is settled
before the next mutation occurs Metz et al 	

 The population is thereby
assumed to consist of one type only which can be substituted by another type
etc This describes a dynamics in trait space which seems utterly remote from the
description of population frequencies given by replicator dynamics but which in
important cases reduces to it In particular if the trait space is a simplex for
instance probabilities for certain types of behaviour with a suitable Riemannian
metric one obtains  again But this should not obscure the fact that replicator
dynamics and adaptive dynamics adress fundamentally dierent processes operat
ing on distinct timescales One describes shortterm evolution  the population
dynamics of the frequencies of a given set of genes or traits the other describes
longterm evolution the repeated introduction of new mutations Eshel 	


If the invaders reproductive success is a linear function of its trait then an
ESS is locally stable for each adaptive dynamics but for many examples this
assumption does not hold and the evolution in trait space may well lead away
from an ESS
Often two players engaged in a biological game belong to dierent popula
tions with dierent sets of strategies Most of the previous results carry over to
such tworole games but the general tendency is that there is still less stability for
instance no mixed strategy can be an ESS there exists an incompressible volume
form heteroclinic cycles become more frequent etc
The interacting populations can be dierent species  for instance predators
and their prey  and in this case adaptive dynamics leads to models of coevolution
A typical question in this context is whether coevolution may lead to interaction
parameters such that the population numbers oscillate chaotically  a question
on which the jury is still out The interacting populations can also belong to the
same species males and females have conicting interests about their amount of
parental investment owners and intruders about territorial issues etc In that
case rolespecic strategies are likely to evolve for example if owner be prepared
to ght to the end if intruder avoid escalation
Before turning to some applications it should be emphasised again that es
sential aspects can change completely if supplementary eects are included for
instance spatial distribution Takeuchi 	

 genetic or physiological heterogene
ity stochastic uctuations Durrett 	

	 or time lags Gopalsamy 	


 Population Dynamics of Infectious Diseases Applications of mathe
matical modelling to epidemiology immunology and virology are of increasing
biomedical relevance They help to understand the course of infectious diseases
both within organisms and within populations and suggest guidelines for treat
ment and vaccination
Within a population the interactions of infected susceptible and immune
organisms lead to endemic or epidemic spread of the disease In a commonly used
epidemiological model Anderson and May 	

	 if frequencies of uninfected and
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infected hosts are denoted by x and y this becomes
x  k  dx cy  
xy 	
y  y
x d v  c 	 
where k is a constant birth or immigration term d the mortality of uninfected
v the extra mortality due to the infection ie the virulence and c the rate
of recovery which in this simple model does not confer immunity The model
assumes that new infections occur through random contacts between infected and
susceptibles An infection can only spread if the frequency x of uninfected exceeds
d  c  v
 This threshold principle a cornerstone of epidemiology holds
for most of the variants of the model including immunity other transmission
mechanisms periodic oscillations in susceptiblity other birth and death rates
etc For many diseases one has to consider several classes of hosts dierent risk
groups for instance in the case of AIDS see Dietz and Hadeler 	
 Some of
these extensions lead to chaotic dynamics Grenfell and Dobson 	

 Olsen and
Schaer 	


Infections are caused by pathogens virus bacteria protozoa which can all
be subsumed as parasites In 		  the pathogen can invade only if the disease
free equilibrium x  kd is not saturated ie if the basic reproductive rate
R


k

dd  v  c
	
the number of secondary infections produced by an infected in a population of
susceptibles exceeds 	
The population dynamics of diseasecarrying parasites and their impact on
the population dynamics of the host is an area of rapid growth Even the simplest
models display oscillations The relation between parasites and their host resem
bles that between predators and prey of course parasites can mediate permanent
coexistence between competing strains of hosts etc Heteroclinic cycles are likely
to occur for instance when two strains of a host engaged in a bistable competition
are beset by two suitably specialised strains of parasites a resident population of
host 	 can be invaded by parasite 	 the resulting equilibrium can be invaded by
host  eliminating hosts and parasites of type 	 which in turn allows parasite 
to invade etc
The dynamics described so far deal with the course of an infection within a
population Its development within an individual host is no less dramatic and con
stitutes a new chapter in biomathematics dealing with the population dynamics
and evolution of the biosphere beneath the skin of the host organism These eco
logical systems are ideally suited for modelling since they involve huge populations
and short generations and are subject of intensive clinical tests
HIV oers the most studied example As is wellknown the fullblown symp
toms of AIDS develop only after a latency period of some ten years But this
quietness is misleading Clinial tests based on simple dynamical models have re
vealed a erce battle between the virus and the immune system of the HIVinfected
patient The average rate of HIV production exceeds 	

particles a day Free
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virus particles are cleared within a few hours Virus infected cells live on average
two days
HIV needs human cells the target cells to reproduce In doing so it kills
these cells Hence virus and target cells interact in much the same way as preda
tors and their prey But HIV is not only a predator it is also a prey The immune
system contains a vast repertoire of possible responses dierent types of antibod
ies killer cells etc whose production is stimulated by specic pathogens The
immune responses attack and destroy the pathogens Thus killer cells and virus
also interact like predators and prey Much clinical research has recently gone into
nding out which role  prey or predator  has more relevance for HIV dynamics
At present it appears that target cell limitation and immune control are of the
same magnitude This leads to preypredatorsuperpredator systems which as
known from ecology eg Hastings and Powell 	

	 exhibit complex dynamics
In our case the simplest model reduces to
x  k  dx 
xv
y  
xv  ay  pyz
v  ry  sv 	
z  cyz  bz
Here x resp y are the frequencies of uninfected resp infected cells v that
of free virus particles and z the abundance of the killer cells produced by the
immune response Nowak and Bangham 	

 DeBoer and Perelson 	

 There
is a minimum threshold of infected cells to activate an immune response y 
bc The frequencies oscillate around an equilibrium value which can be stable
or unstable ie subject to a Hopf bifurcation The model shows that increasing
the responsiveness c of the immune system decreases the abundance y of infected
cells but not necessarily the density z of the killer cells in other words there is no
simple correlation between virus load and the magnitude of the immune response
 The Evolution of Virulence Most pathogens evolve very quickly due to
their short generation time their high mutation rate and the intensive selection
pressure acting on them HIV for instance spends on average 	 generations
within the body of a patient During this time its genetic diversity increases
relentlessly due to copying errors so that the immune system is faced with ever
new challenges
Mathematical models of the interaction between virus replication and immune
response led to completely new interpretations of disease progression in HIV in
fection Nowak et al 	

	 HIV evolution can shift the steady state within an
infected individual and lead to escape from immune responses Such immune
responses are triggered by specic parts socalled epitopes of the virus In the
simplest model the virus has two epitopes with two variants each yielding an
eightdimensional predatorprey equation
v
ij
 v
ij
r
ij
 x
i
 y
j
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x
i
 x
i
c
i
v
i
 v
i
 b 	
y
j
 y
j
k
j
v
j
 v
j
 b
where v
ij
is the concentration of the virus with sequence i at the rst and j at the
second epitope 	  i j   and x
i
and y
j
are the concentrations of antibodies
directed at sequence i of the rst resp j of the second epitope Generically one
or two of the four viral species and the same number of antibody species have to
vanish and the remaining densities oscillate Nowak et al 	

 A homogenous
virus population induces an immunodominant response against a single epitope
but a new variant at this epitope can cause the immune response to shift to the
other epitope Heterogenous virus population stimulate complicated uctuating
responses
This dynamic picture of HIV infection was conrmed by detailed analysis of
virus decay slopes in drug treated patients Again mathematical models were at
the core of this newly developing demography of virus infection
The extreme mutability of HIV explains also why drugresistant forms emerge
so rapidly Resistance against combinations of drugs requires several mutations
Mathematical models help in devising optimum treatment schedules based on com
bination therapy
This is one chapter of a Darwinian medicine grounded in evolutionary biol
ogy In this domain the evolution of virulence ie the parasiteinduced mortality
of host organisms is of particular importance Levin and Pimentel 	
	 Frank
	

 Pathogens use the bodies of their hosts both as resource and as vehicle
Textbook knowledge presumed that parasites would always evolve towards de
creased virulence since it is better to milk the host rather than butcher it If
parasites become too virulent they face extinction by depleting their reservoir of
susceptibles It was concluded that successful parasites all become benign The
most impressive example of such an evolution towards harmlessness is the myx
oma virus released in Australia to kill rabbits within few years the death rate
of infected rabbits dropped from more than 

 percent to less than  percent
Similar trends have been observed in many human diseases Adaptive dynamics
shows that evolution can actually turn parasites into mutualists necessary for the
survival of their hosts Law and Dieckmann 	


But not all parasites become harmless Selection for a higher basic repro
ductive rate R

often leads to conicting demands on infectivity and longterm
exploitation If in 	 for instance the virulence v is an increasing function of
the transmission rate 
 then R

need not necessarily decrease in v And in the
case of superinfection ie when several strains compete within a host selection
on parasites does not optimise R

 Roughly speaking more virulent strains will
have a selective advantage in the intrahost competition and less virulent in the
interhost competition Parasites face a socalled tragedy of the commons the
need to outgrow their rivals forces them to overexploit the host thus possibly
driving their common resource to extinction Game theoretical arguments help in
analysing such situations In general there will be no evolutionarily stable strain
Nowak and May 	

 
Of particular interest is the adaptive dynamics of viral particles which can
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spread either by horizontal transmission ie by infecting of new hosts or by ver
tical transmission in the form of provirus integrated into the hosts genome Even
if we assume that two strains cannot coexist within one host no superinfection
they can coexist within the population if one is favoured by vertical and the other
by horizontal transmission Lipsitch et al 	


 From the Red Queen to the Major Transitions The parasites ecol
ogy is further complicated by countermeasures of the hosts which tend to reduce
virulence Due to their short generation time parasites can quickly adapt to pre
vailing host defenses but sexual reproduction allows host organisms to recombine
their genes and thus to present shifting targets to the pathogens trying to enter
the cells
Many evolutionary biologists view this as the main reason for the prevalence
of sexual reproduction Hamilton 	
 Indeed the host faces a peculiar prob
lem of frequency dependent selection Gene combinations for successful immune
systems tend to spread but if they become too widespread they cannot remain
successful since parasites will adapt Sexual host species keep reshu ing their
gene combinations thus providing them with the advantage of being rare
This is the socalled Red Queen theory of sex named after a gure from the
sequel of Alice in Wonderland in whose realm you have to run with all your speed
just to stay in place  a familiar feature in coevolution A species can never stop
adapting since the other species do not stop either Mathematical models for the
resulting arms races display a profusion of limit cycles irregular oscillations and
heteroclinic attractors
The Red Queen metapher makes evolution look like a treadmill rather than
a ladder to progress Nevertheless evolution has come up with increasingly com
plex structures through a sequence of major transitions Maynard Smith and
Szathmary 	

 Cell dierentiation immune systems or neural networks are
examples of breakthrough inventions Understanding these major transitions nec
essarily requires thought experiments and mathematical modelling A major issue
for evolutionary biology is sex  a cooperative activity causing an endless series of
conicts In the wake of the primary question  why should an organism transmit
only half of its genes to its ospring  many other problems surface Why do
sexually reproducing species have two sexes rather than three or one Why are
their roles asymmetrical males producing tiny sperm cells and females large egg
cells Why is the sex ratio close to one Why are males ghting for females and
why are females choosier than males And since this is biology why are there
exceptions to all these rules All these questions have been adressed by evolution
ary game theory see eg Hutson and Law 	

 Karlin and Lessard 	
 or
Iwasa and Sasaki 	

Some of the major transitions in evolution led to new levels of organisation for
instance selfreplicating molecules chromosomes cells multicellular organisms
colonies and societies In most cases this emergence of nested hierarchies was due
to the fusion of formerly independent units into entities of higher order These
remain threatened by exploitation through mutinies of selsh elements improving
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their own propagation at a heavy cost to the larger unit Cancer cells grow without
restraint within a genome socalled outlaw genes subvert the segregation of
chromosomes in a cell division etc Each instance of cooperation is riddled with
internal conicts
Selshness may have been an issue since the dawn of life when several types of
selfreplicating RNA molecules must have ganged up in order to code for chemical
functions How could they coexist As one possible solution Eigen and Schuster
	
 suggested the hypercycle a closed feedback loop of chemical kinetics with
RNA of type M
i
catalysing the replication of RNA of type M
i 
counting the
indices i mod n The equation for the relative densities x
i
of M
i
is given by
the replicator equation  with f
i
 x
i 
F
i
x and F
i
  for all i If the F
i
are constants there exists a globally stable xed point in intS
n
for n   and a
stable periodic orbit for n   see Hofbauer et al 	

	 This dynamics is always
permanent so that hypercyclic coupling does indeed guarantee the coexistence of
all RNA types But if there occurs an RNA type M which prots from M
i
more
than M
i 
does then M will displaceM
i 
 even if it confers no catalytic benets
to the other RNA such a molecular parasite destroys the whole cycle
 The Evolution of Cooperation Evolutionary history began with molec
ular networks and led to tightlyknit societies acting as coherently as single or
ganisms do Bee hives and termite states furnish striking examples Their ex
traordinary degree of cooperation is due to the close kinship between all members
of a society a gene for helping ones sister is helping copies of itself The close
relatedness within a bee hive is due to the fact that only very few of its members
reproduce This type of cooperation can be explained by kinship theory It is
based on the rule that an altruistic act costing c to the donor in terms of repro
ductive success and benetting b to the recipient has a selective advantage if the
relatedness between donor and recipient exceeds the costtobenet ratio cb
In human societies kinship accounts only for a small part of the cooperation
the larger part is due to economic rather than genetic factors The simplest mech
anism is direct reciprocation as long as c  b it pays to help others if they will
return the help This creates new opportunities for parasitism by not returning
help Game theory provides a readymade model succintely capturing this aspect
The Prisoners Dilemma PD is a symmetric game between two players who can
opt between the moves C to cooperate and D to defect The payo matrix is
C D
C
D

R S
T P

	
with
T  R  P  S and R  T  S 	

the rst condition means that the reward R for mutual cooperation is larger than
the punishment P for mutual defection but that the temptation T for unilateral
defection is still larger and the suckers payo S for being exploited ranks lowest
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In our case R  b  c P   T  b and S  c Obviously it is best to play
D no matter what the other is doing
This changes if we assume that there is always a probability w for a further
round which is larger than T  RT  P  ie cb The iterated PD game
has a random number of rounds with mean 	  w
 
and admits a huge set
of strategies This model led to a vast amount of investigations often based on
computer tournaments simulating populations of players meeting randomly and
engaging in an iterated PD game In Axelrods rst tournaments see Axelrod
and Hamilton 	
	 the Tit For Tat strategy TFT play C in the rst round
and from then on repeat the coplayers previous move performed extremely well
despite its simplicity But TFT is not evolutionarily stable indeed the strategy
of always cooperating can spread by neutral drift in a population of TFT players
and defectors can subsequently invade Moreover errors between TFT players
lead to costly runs of alternating defections
To analyse the iterated PD under noise ie with a small probability of genetic
or strategic errors let us rst considermemoryone strategies only Such strategies
are given by the probability to play C in the rst round and a quadruple p 
p
R
 p
S
 p
T
 p
P
 where p
i
denotes the players propensity for move C after having
experienced outcome i  fRS T Pg in the previous round Due to ocasional
mistakes the initial move plays almost no role in long interactions w close to
	 The dynamics becomes extremely complex for instance restriction to the
following four strategies leads to a heteroclinic network as attractor see g b
	 Tit For Tat 	  	   the more tolerant Firm But Fair 	  	 	 which
forgives an opponents defection if it was matched by an own defection  the
parasitic Bully    	 which cooperates only after punishment and   the
strategy     which always defects
But if we introduce occasional mutants then longterm evolution leads for
R  TP  ie b  c to the socalled Pavlov strategy 	   	 which coperates
only if the coplayer in the previous round acted like oneself Nowak and Sigmund
	

 This strategy embodies the simplest learning rule called winstay lose
shift by experimental psychologists It consists in repeating the previous move
if the payo was high R or T  and in switching to the other option if it was
low P or S Pavlov players cooperate with each other an erroneous defection
leads in the next round to both players defecting and then to a resumption of
mutual cooperation Furthermore Pavlov populations cannot be invaded by other
strategies and in particular not by indiscriminate cooperators who pave the way
for defectors On the other hand Pavlov cannot invade a strategy of defectors
this needs a small cluster of strongly retaliatory strategies like TFT who eliminate
unconditional defectors and then yield to Pavlov
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Fig  Dynamics of indirect reciprocity
What about strategies with longer memory or yet more general nitestate
automata Such strategies are dened by a nite set ! of inner states some
possibly stochastic rule specifying which move to play when in state  and a
rule specifying the transition to the next state as a function of the previous state
and of the outcome of the current round RS T or P  Together with the initial
state this denes a strategy for the iterated PD An example is given by the
following table
R S T P
	 	   	
 	  	 
 	 	  
It is easy to check that this example satises a variant of evolutionary stability if
all coplayers use that strategy it is best at every stage of the game to follow the
same strategy This denes a social norm There are many such norms including
Pavlov if R  TP  and it is not easy to decide which will get selected But this
example seems particularly successful and it has an intuitive appeal if we interpret
state  as provoked and state  as contrite indeed an erroneous defection by one
player makes that player feel contrite and the coplayer provoked the retaliation
redresses the balance Such inner states may correspond to emotions which are
increasingly seen as tools for handling the complexities of social life
Indirect Reciprocity Obviously the iterated PD captures only a part of the
cooperative interactions in human societies There is another indirect reciprocity
whereby an altruistic act is returned not by the recipient as with direct reci
procity but by someone else Indirect reciprocity involves reputation A simple
model assumes that a score is attached to each player which increases or de
creases whenever the player provides or witholds help Players help whenever
the score of the potential recipient exceeds some threshold This threshold is sub
ject to selection Punishing a lowscorer is costly as it decreases ones own score
but if defectors are not punished they take over Assuming that each player is
engaged in a few rounds both as potential donor and recipient but never meeting
the same coplayer twice one nds that mutationselection chronicles lead toward
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cooperation provided players know their coplayers score suciently well Nowak
and Sigmund 	


Occasionally waves of defection sweep through the population they are pro
voked by an excessive frequency of indiscriminate altruists who are too ready to
help lowscorers Cooperation is more robust if the society is challenged more
frequently by invasion attempts of defectors an intriguing parallel to immune sys
tems This can be nicely captured by an even simpler model involving only three
types of players with frequencies x

 x

 x

 namely a indiscriminate altruists
b defectors and c discriminate altruists who help except if the coplayer with
eld help If we assume two rounds per player for instance both as a donor and
as a recipient the payos are
f

 b c bx


f

 bx

 bx


f

 b c cx


If discriminating altruists are too rare ie if x

 cb c defectors take over
But all orbits with x

 cb  c lead from the edge x

no defectors back
to itself A mixture of altruists gets established We may expect that random
drift makes the state uctuate along this edge which consists of xed points only
and that occasionally mutation introduces a small quantity x

of defectors What
happens If x

 cb defectors cannot invade If
c
b
 x


c
b c
 	
the invading defectors thrive at rst but are subsequently eliminated by discrim
inating altruists After such an abortive invasion the ratio of discriminators is so
large that defectors can no longer invade Only when random uctuations cross
the interval given by 	 will defectors take over But this takes time If defectors
try too often to invade they will not succeed see g  
Such models show how cooperation emerges through the selection of learning
rules moralistic emotions social norms and reputation Thus evolutionary models
explain the ceaseless give and take prevailing in human societies and lead game
theory back towards its original economic motivation
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